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DUMP IT HERE, I NEED THE MONEY: 
RESTORATION DAMAGES FOR TEMPORARY INJURY 
TO REAL PROPERTY HELD FOR PERSONAL USE 
Christopher E. Brown* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After a long day you come home to find that the construction crew at 
the new homesite next door negligently drove a truck through the back 
yard of your dream house. The truck left deep ruts in the soil and 
destroyed all of your prized ornamental Japanese shrubs. The injury is 
temporary and restorable.1 Fully restoring the back yard and shrubbery 
will cost $20,000, but the market value of your property was lowered by 
just $2000. You are devastated and want nothing but to have your back 
yard restored to its original condition. Obtaining general damages2 
* Solicitations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1995-
1996. 
1 Restoration damages generally are available only for temporary injury to real property, as 
permanent injury is not restorable. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF DAMAGES § 5.2(2), at 716-18 (2d 
ed. 1993). The definition of permanent injury, however, varies from state to state. Compare 
Millers Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Wildish Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 836, 846 (Or. 1988) (en bane) 
(stating that injury to real property is permanent when it amounts to a "total destruction of 
value") with Newsome v. Billips, 671 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting that injury 
to real property is permanent when restoration cost exceeds diminution in market value of the 
property) and Reeser v. Weaver Bros., 605 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that 
injury to real property is permanent if the injury is irreparable). This Comment, however, 
focuses only on the measure of damages for temporary injury to real property. 
2 Damages are "a sum of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 902 (1977). In this Comment, "general damages" means 
damages awarded to compensate for actual direct injury to real property. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 391 (6th ed. 1990) (defining general damages as damages "such as the law itself 
implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they 
are its immediate, direct, and proximate result from the injury, ... and without reference to 
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equal to the cost of restoration3 would seem fair, and in almost any 
court in the United States you would be entitled to such recovery. 
However, imagine the same situation, but instead of ornamental 
shrubs, the truck destroyed unattractive yet hard to replace bushes. 
Furthermore, you never liked the house much anyway and were 
planning to move. You would appear to have hit the jackpot to the 
tune of $18,000. If you were to receive an award of general damages 
equal to the cost of restoration you then could sell the property for 
$2000 less than its pre-tort market value (i.e., its current market 
value), pocket the award of damages, and end up with an $18,000 
windfall. The purpose of this Comment is to examine varying methods 
of determining which cases, along the range delineated by the cases 
described above, are appropriate for awarding restoration damages. 
It is important to note that all owners of injured real property are 
entitled to recover consequential damages in addition to general dam-
ages for direct 10sses.4 For example, all landowners can recover for 
loss of use of the property and owners who reside on the property 
also can recover for resulting personal annoyance and discomfort.5 
Recovery of such consequential damages can be significant in a case 
of injury to real property.6 Therefore, the total recovery of damages 
the special character, condition or circumstances of the plaintiff'); DOBBS, supra note 1, § 5.2(1), 
at 713. General damages are contrasted with "consequential damages" for injury suffered by 
the landowner as a result of, but separate from, the direct injury to real property, such as 
annoyance and discomfort or loss of use of the property, and "punitive or exemplary damages" 
imposed to punish the tortfeasor and deter other potential tortfeasors. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 390-92 (6th ed. 1990); DOBBS, supra note I, § 5.1(1), at 713; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTS §§ 929(1)(b)-(c) (1977). Certainly, consequential, punitive, and other special types 
of damages are as readily available for injury to real property as in other actions in tort. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 929(1)(bHc) (1977). See also infra note 52 for full text 
of Section 929. However, this Comment focuses only on the measure of general damages for 
injury to real property. 
3 In this Comment, "restoration damages" means "general damages" measured by the cost of 
restoring the property to its pre-tort condition. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 5.2(1), at 714. Restoration 
is intended to be synonymous with "remediation" and "repair," terms that are used interchange-
ably by courts in similar situations. Restoration and the like are distinguished from "restitution" 
damages where a court makes an additional determination that the tortfeasor has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the landowner. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.1; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(2) (1977). For example, in cases where trees are removed 
unlawfully from real property used for timber purposes, damages can be measured by the 
market value of the timber removed by the tortfeasor. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.1; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(2) (1977). 
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 929(1)(b)-(c) (1977). 
5Id. 
6 See Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. City and County of Denver 
Apr. 23, 1993) (order) (awarding $8,000,000 in "annoyance and discomfort" damages to the 
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by the landowners described in the examples above would not be 
limited to diminution in market value, but likely would be enhanced 
by recovery of consequential damages. However, this Comment is 
limited to discussion of the measure of general damages for direct 
losses from injury to real property, and will not address consequential 
damages. 
The standard measure of general damages to real property result-
ing from a temporary tortious injury is the diminution in the market 
value7 of the property.s According to the United States Supreme 
Court: 
[t]he market value of ... a piece of property is the price which it 
might be expected to bring if offered for sale in a fair market; not 
the price which might be obtained on a sale at a public auction or 
a sale forced by necessities of the owner, but such a price as would 
be fixed by negotiation and mutual agreement, after ample time 
to find a purchaser, as between a vendor who is willing (but not 
compelled) to sell and a purchaser who desires to buy but is not 
compelled to take the particular ... piece of property.9 
Courts typically determine diminution in market value through the 
use of objective evidence, such as information regarding comparable 
sales of similar properties with and without analogous injuries or 
other typical standard property valuation techniques. to However, the 
owners of residential property that sustained a diminution in market value injury of $4,159,000), 
reprinted, in part, in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: 
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 41 (Supp. 1994). 
7 Diminution in market value is the difference between the pre-tort and post-tort market 
values of real property. DOBBS, supra note 1 § 5.2(1), at 713. In this Comment, the term "market 
diminution damages" means "general damages" measured by the diminution in market value of 
the injured real property. 
8 E.g., Jackson v. Bohlin, 75 So. 697, 700 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917) ("in actions for injury to real 
property ... the measure of damages is the difference in the value of the land before and after 
the trespass") (quoting Brinkmeyer v. Bethea, 35 So. 996, 997 (Ala. 1904»; Bangert v. Osceola 
County, 456 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 1990) ("[t]he general measure of damages [for injury to real 
property] ... is the difference in the value of the realty before and after the [injury]"); Hopkins 
v. American Pneumatic Servo Co., 80 N.E. 624, 624 (Mass. 1907); Baillon V. Carl Bolander & Sons 
Co., 235 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Minn. 1975) ("It has long been the rule in [Minnesota] that the measure 
of damages for the destruction of trees and shrubbery is the difference between the value of 
the land before and after the damage has been inflicted."); Hueston V. Mississippi & Rum River 
Boom Co., 79 N.W. 92, 93 (Minn. 1899). 
9 BFP V. Resolution Trust Corp., _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994) (quoting BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 971 (6th ed. 1990». 
10 See Keitges V. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Neb. 1992); see also June Fletcher, 
How to Price a Property That's Unusual, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1996, at Al 
(discussing various property valuation techniques). 
702 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:699 
use of market diminution damages "does not in all cases afford a 
correct measure of indemnity, and is not therefore a 'universal test."'ll 
Restoration damages are, in appropriate cases, available to owners 
of injured real property.12 Restoration damages generally are avail-
able when the cost of restoration does not significantly exceed the 
diminution in market value of the property.13 Courts grant restoration 
damages in these cases in an attempt to compensate fully landowners 
for their losses.14 Such award of restoration damages recognizes the 
landowners' right to use their property according to their tastes and 
wishes,15 as well as the inability to assess exactly diminution in market 
value.16 
This Comment, however, examines particular situations where courts 
have awarded enhanced recovery of general damages for temporary 
injury, measured by the cost of restoration, that significantly exceed 
the diminution in market value of the injured real property.17 Spe-
cifically, this Comment examines situations where courts allowed res-
toration damages after finding that a particular landowner had "per-
sonal reasons"18 for wanting the property restored, and that market 
This is also the standard method of real property valuation used in eminent domain proceed-
ings. See, e.g., Massachusetts-American Water Co. v. Grafton Water Dist. (No.1), 631 N.E.2d 
59,60-61 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 636 N.E.2d 279 (Mass. 1994); Benevolent & Protective 
Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Lawrence Redev. Auth., 604 N.E.2d 715, 716 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1992). 
11 Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Mass. 1987) (quoting 
Wall v. Platt, 48 N.E. 270, 273 (Mass. 1897». 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). See infra notes 52-57 and 
accompanying text for full text and discussion of Section 929. 
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). 
14 See Thatcher v. Lane Constr. Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (holding that 
market diminution damages are "not an arbitrary and exact formula to be applied in every case 
without regard to whether its application would compensate the injured party fully"); Brereton 
v. Dixon, 433 P.2d 3, 5 (Utah 1967) (noting that market diminution damages will not always fulfill 
the goal of full compensation and, therefore, restoration damages are generally available); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 1, at 5-Q (5th ed. 1984) 
(stating that full compensation is the function of tort law). See also infra notes 56-57 and 
accompanying text. 
15 Thatcher, 254 N.E.2d at 708; Brereton, 433 P.2d at 5. 
16 Brereton, 433 P.2d at 5 (recognizing the difficulty in exactly assessing the extent of diminu-
tion in market value of an injured property); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Wyo. 1984) 
(noting that diminution in market value "cannot be determined with mathematical precision 
[and] may be inherently uncertain"). 
17 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
18 Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding a '''personal reason' 
exception" in California); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929 cmt.b (1977) (referring to 
"reasons personal to the owner" as justification for an award of restoration damages). 
1996] RESTORATION DAMAGES 703 
diminution damages would fail to compensate fully the landowner for 
his or her losses.19 In other words, these courts recognize the presence 
of idiosyncratic20 value that enhances the actual value of a parcel of 
real property to its owner.21 
Section II of this Comment examines the historical use of market 
diminution damages and restoration damages, and the development 
of the personal reasons exception allowing restoration damages that 
significantly exceed the diminution in market value of the injured real 
property. Section III investigates the types of temporary real prop-
erty injury cases that courts have found to qualify for the personal 
reasons exception. Section III continues by examining whether such 
restoration damages must be accompanied by a determination that 
the damages are likely to be spent on restoration. Finally, section III 
outlines what, if anything, is the upper limit on the magnitude of 
restoration damages in these cases and how such an upper limit is 
determined. Section IV analyzes different applications of the personal 
reasons exception, with a special emphasis on applications from Cali-
fornia and Colorado, and discusses the relative merits of the different 
applications. 
II. HISTORICAL USE OF MARKET DIMINUTION DAMAGES 
AND RESTORATION DAMAGES FOR TEMPORARY INJURY 
TO REAL PROPERTY 
A. The Primary Purpose of Tort Damages and the Traditional 
Methods of Measurement 
The primary purpose of damages in tort law is "compensation of 
individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered 
within the scope of their legally recognized interests."22 Thus, al-
19 See infra sections II.B & III. 
20 Idiosyncratic means something "peculiar to the individual." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1124 (1986). Idiosyncratic 
value in the context of injury to real property is value recognized by the owner of the property 
but not by the market. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 'lbRTS § 911 cmt.e (1977); DOBBS, supra 
note 1, § 5.2(1), at 715; see also Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Neb. 1992) ("[o]ne 
person's unsightly jungle may be another person's enchanted forest"). 
21 See Watson v. Jones, 36 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1948); Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 143; Gilman v. 
Brown, 91 N.W. 227, 229 (Wisc. 1902). 
22 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 1, at 5--6; accord Dealers Hobby, Inc. v. Marie Ann Realty 
Co., 255 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Iowa 1977) (stating that the purpose oftort damages is to "place the 
injured party in as favorable a position as though no wrong had been committed"); Samson 
Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 147 A.2d 430, 434 (Md. 1958) (stating that the purpose of tort 
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though public policy arguably often supports property restoration 
without regard to cost, such as in cases involving serious environ-
mental injury, common law tort plaintiffs may recover only for injury 
to their individual interests.23 
The sta.ndard measure of general damages considered sufficient to 
compensate a landowner fully for injury to real property is, and long 
has been, the diminution in market value of the property.24 Market 
diminution damages tend to compensate landowners fully for direct, 
not consequential, losses because courts presume that the owner val-
ues the property exactly as much as the market would value the 
property, regardless of how the owner uses the property.25 Therefore, 
courts generally presume that the diminution in market value of 
injured property is equal to the extent of direct injury to a land-
owner.26 The market diminution damage award has the simple effect 
of restoring the total personal net worth of the landowner to its 
pre-tort level.27 
damages is to compensate the injured party fully for losses); Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 141; Denoyer 
v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("The cardinal rule of the law of damages is 
that the injured party shall be fully compensated."); Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Constr. Co., 871 
P.2d 601, 612 (Wash. Ct. App.) ("[t]he goal of awarding damages is to fully compensate the 
plaintiff for loss or injury"), review denied, 883 P.2d 326 (Wash. 1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF ToRTS § 901(a) (1977); see Enid & Anadarko Ry. v. Wiley, 78 P. 96, 99 (Okla. 1904) (stating 
that the purpose of tort damages is to compensate the injured party for actual losses incurred). 
23 See Maxedon v. Texaco Producing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (D. Kan. 1989) (rejecting 
landowner's public policy argument for damages in excess of injury to landowner's individual 
interests). 
24 E.g., Jackson v. Bohlin, 75 So. 697, 700 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917); Bangert v. Osceola County, 456 
N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 1990); Hopkins v. American Pneumatic Serv. Co., 80 N.E. 624, 624 (Mass. 
1907); Baillon v. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 235 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Minn. 1975); Hueston v. 
Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 79 N.W. 92, 93 (Minn. 1899). 
25 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994) (indicating 
that the value of a piece of property to its owner is equal to its market value); United States v. 
North Carolina Granite Corp., 288 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1961) (finding that actual value of goods 
is the price of the goods at the point of sale); State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, 470 P.2d 967, 
970 (Mont. 1970) (holding that "actual value" means "market value" in statute requiring that 
property owners in eminent domain proceedings be compensated in the amount of the actual 
value of the property taken); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 35 (6th ed. 1990) ("'actual value,' 
'market value,' 'fair market value,' 'just compensation' and the like may be used as convertible 
terms"). 
26 See North CaroliruL Granite Corp., 288 F.2d at 234; Vaughan, 470 P.2d at 970. See also supra 
note 24 (citing cases that hold that the standard measure of damages for injury to land is the 
diminution in market value). 
27 While this restores the net worth of the landowner to its pre-tort level, the component parts 
of this net worth now include a lower amount of equity in land and a higher amount of liquid 
assets, such as money, as the result of a money damages award. 
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However, the market diminution measure of damages is not always 
used because it sometimes does not provide full compensation for a 
landowner's 10sses.28 Courts recognize that the right of landowners to 
use their property according to their own tastes and wishes, and not 
necessarily according to the property's highest and best economic use, 
is a significant right worthy of compensation.29 The 1902 Wisconsin 
Supreme Court case of Gilman v. Brown recognized the significance 
of this right, stating: 
[i]t must not be forgotten that recovery in trespass is always 
based upon a wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's rights, and that 
the rule of damages adopted should be such as to more carefully 
guard against failure of compensation to the injured party than 
against possible overcharge upon the wrongdoer. An owner of real 
estate has the right to enjoy it according to his own taste and 
wishes, and the arrangement of buildings, shade trees, fruit trees, 
and the like may be very important to him, may be the result of 
large expense, and the modification thereof may be an injury to 
his convenience and comfort in the use of his premises which fairly 
ought to be substantially compensated, and yet the arrangement 
so selected by him might be no considerable enhancement of the 
sale value of the premises, it might not meet the taste of others, 
and the disturbance of that arrangement, therefore, might not 
impair the general market value. Hence it is apparent that while 
the owner may be deprived of something valuable to him, for 
which he would be willing to pay substantial sums of money, yet 
he might be wholly unable to prove any considerable damages 
merely in the form of depreciation of the market value of the land. 
The owner of property has a right to hold it for his own use as 
well as to hold it for sale, and if he has elected the former he 
should be compensated for an injury wrongfully done to him in 
that respect, although that injury might be unappreciable to one 
holding the same premises for purposes of sale.3o 
Therefore, damages equal to the cost of restoration enabling the 
landowner to return the injured property to its pre-tort condition are 
justified in some cases. 
28 See Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Mass. 1987); 
Benavie v. Baker, 420 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (stating that cost of restoration 
is an equally appropriate measure as diminution in market value in actions for injury to shade 
trees). 
29 E.g., Watson v. Jones, 36 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1948); Gilman v. Brown, 91 N.W. 227, 229 (Wise. 
1902). 
30 Gilman, 91 N.W. at 229. 
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Any award of restoration damages must be reasonable under the 
circumstances.31 Specifically, there exists a principle that prohibits 
damage awards that are economically wasteful or constitute a windfall 
to the injured landowner.32 In general, restoration damages are con-
sidered reasonable if they are less than or do not significantly exceed 
the diminution in market value.33 In determining the reasonableness 
of restoration costs, courts consider the inability to assess property 
values exactly in some situations.34 This reasonableness condition mir-
rors the principle purpose of tort damages-to compensate a plaintiff 
fully for injury while avoiding economically wasteful awards.35 There-
fore, as a general rule, a plaintiff in a tort action for injury to real 
property cannot enhance recovery by insisting on restoration dam-
ages that significantly exceed the diminution in the market value of 
the property.36 
Historically, courts have awarded restoration damages for injury to 
real property in cases where the cost of restoration was less than the 
diminution in market value,37 or where the cost of restoration was 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) (1977). 
32 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); DOBBS, 
supra note 1, § 5.2(1), at 714--15. 
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
34 See Brereton v. Dixon, 433 P.2d 3, 5 (Utah 1967); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1325 
(Wyo. 1984). 
35 See McKinney v. Christiana Community Builders, 280 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) ("Courts normally will not award costs of repair which exceed diminution in value because 
the basic objective of compensatory damages is to make an injured party whole, but no more 
than that."); Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text (outlining 
purpose of tort damages). 
36 E.g., Orndorffv. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr.193, 197 (Cal. Ct. App.1990) 
("[T]he owner of a unique home or automobile cannot insist on its reconstruction where the cost 
to do so far exceeds the value of the home or automobile. Nor are repair costs appropriate where 
only slight damage has occurred and the cost of repair is far in excess of the loss in value."); 
Newsome v. Billips, 671 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) ("[R]epair is unreasonable when its 
cost exceeds the difference in the before and after values [of the injured property]."); Enid & 
Anadarko Ry. v. Wiley, 78 P. 96, 99 (Okla. 1904) ("[T]he rule of avoidable consequences [requires] 
that ... plaintiff[s] shall diminish the loss as much as possible."). 
37 Jackson v. Bohlin, 75 So. 697, 700 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917) (stating that cost of restoration is 
appropriate where "the cost of restoring the property is less than the depreciation in the value 
of the land"); City of Globe v. Rabogliatti, 210 P. 685, 688 (Ariz. 1922); Salstrom v. Orleans Bar 
Gold Mining Co., 96 P. 292, 295-96 (Cal. 1908); City of Covington v. Berry, 87 S.w. 317, 318-19 
(Ky. 1905); Wright v. City of Butte, 210 P. 78, 80 (Mont. 1922); Smith v. City of Kansas City, 30 
S.w. 314, 316 (Mo. 1895); Barberi v. Bochinsky, 128 A.2d 1,4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) 
(finding that landowner is entitled to restoration "so long as such cost is not in excess of the 
diminution in value of the land resulting from the wrong"); Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 31 N.E. 997, 
998 (N.Y. 1892) ("when ... the cost of restoring the land to its former condition, is less than 
what is shown to be the diminution in the market value of the whole property by reason of the 
1996] RESTORATION DAMAGES 707 
considered strong evidence of diminution in market value.38 In such 
cases, courts have reasoned that restoration damages were reason-
able and appropriate.39 Courts also have awarded restoration damages 
in cases where the property was of such a specialized nature that the 
property's market value was not ascertainable, specifically because 
the property was not of a type typically bought or sold.40 
For example, in Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company, the plaintiff sought restoration damages for injury to 
its church building in the Back Bay section of Boston.41 Excavation 
for the construction of the adjacent Hancock Tower had undermined 
the church's foundation.42 In awarding the plaintiff a version of resto-
ration damages,43 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted 
injury, such cost of restoration is the proper measure of damages"); Enid & Anadarko Ry., 78 
P. at 100 (holding that the cost of restoration is the measure of damages if it is less than the 
diminution in value); City of Fort Worth v. Howard, 22 S.W. 1059, 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893); 
see Newsome, 671 S.W.2d at 255. 
38 E.g., Jackson, 75 So. at 699 ("[T]estimony showing the cost of replacing the fence was 
admissible for the purpose of shedding light upon the amount of damage plaintiff suffered in the 
depreciation in the value of his lands."); Worthington v. Roberts, 803 S.W.2d 906, 909-10 (Ark. 
1991) (noting, in dictum, that cost of restoration "could possibly be of some help in guiding the 
jury to determine the difference in the value of the land immediately before and inlmediately 
after the [injury]"); Bangert v. Osceola County, 456 N.W.2d 183, 190-91 (Iowa 1990) (finding 
evidence of the value of injured trees "competent as indicative of the diminution in the value of 
the land"); Delay Mfg. Co. v. Carey, 13 A.2d 152, 153 (N.H. 1940); Clay v. Jersey City, 181 A.2d 
545, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962) (stating that reasonable restoration costs may be 
considered to determine extent of market diminution), aff'd, 200 A.2d 787 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.), cert. denied, 203 A.2d 717 (N.J. 1964); see Stratford Theater, Inc. v. Town of Stratford, 101 
A.2d 279, 280-81 (Conn. 1953) (finding cost of repairing a small sewer line to abate a nuisance 
indicative of diminution in market value); Tortolano v. DiFilippo, 349 A.2d 48, 52 (R.!. 1975) 
(finding restoration damages appropriate for damage to residential property, but denying infla-
tion adjustment that would bring total damages to current cost of restoration). 
Courts have extended this reasoning to justify an award of restoration damages where a 
plaintiff already has attempted or completed repairs subsequently found to be reasonable. See 
Stratford Theater, Inc., 101 A.2d at 280-81. In fact, the original drafters of the damages section 
of the Restatement of Torts appear to have been especially concerned with the possibility that 
an owner of injured real property might attempt repairs and then not be able to recover those 
costs. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS: DAMAGES-PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT No.3 at 51 (Mar. 21, 1938). 
39 E.g., Jackson, 75 So. at 700; City of Globe, 210 P. at 688; Worthington, 803 S.W.2d at 909-10; 
Salstrom, 96 P. at 295-96; Bangert, 456 N.W.2d at 190-91; City of Covington, 87 S.w. at 318-19; 
Wright, 210 P. at 80; Smith, 30 S.W. at 316; Delay Mfg. Co., 13 A.2d at 153; Barberi, 128 A.2d at 
4; Clay, 181 A.2d at 549; Hartshorn, 31 N.E. at 998; Enid & Anadarko Ry., 78 P. at 100; City 
of Fort Worth, 22 S.W. at 1060; see Stratford Theater, Inc., 101 A.2d at 280-81; Newsome, 671 
S.W.2d at 255; Tortolano, 349 A.2d at 52. 
40 See Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 535-36 (Mass. 1987). 
41Id. at 533. 
42 Id. at 534. 
43 Id. at 536-37. The court specifically awarded damages equal to a percentage of the depre-
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that "[f1or certain categories of property, termed 'special purpose 
property' (such as the property of nonprofit, charitable, or religious 
organizations), there will not generally be an active market from 
which the diminution in market value may be determined."44 Thus, the 
court could not measure damages on the basis of diminution in market 
value.45 
In addition, restoration damages have been awarded for injury to 
property caused by willful or malicious conduct on the part of the 
defendant.46 Some courts also have stated that cases where there is 
no diminution, or even an increase in market value, are unique situ-
ations justifying restoration damages because otherwise the land-
owner would be left without a remedy.47 On closer examination, how-
ever, this particular exception is really just a situational application 
of the personal reasons exception discussed in the following section.46 
In such cases, courts appear to be making an implicit determination 
that to deny restoration damages for a tort inflicted on a property, a 
plaintiff would not be compensated fully for the direct loss incurred.49 
In other words, the injury resulted in loss of value idiosyncratic to 
the landowner and thus not recognized by the market. Without this 
implicit finding of idiosyncratic value, an award of restoration dam-
ages in such a case would go beyond simply compensating a plaintiff 
for the direct loss incurred, as a landowner who holds property solely 
for economic gain has experienced no direct loss if there was no 
diminution in market value of the property.50 Of course, recovery for 
any consequential damages such as annoyance and discomfort or loss 
ciated cost of reconstruction of the church. The damages were depreciated because the church 
foundation would not be repaired fully, but would be reconstructed at some future date. The 
plaintiff received only a percentage of these costs because the foundation was slowly deterio-
rating naturally and the injury only had hastened the day when total reconstruction would be 
undertaken. [d. 
44 [d. at 535-36. 
45 Trinity Church, 502 N.E.2d at 536. 
46 See Raide v. Dollar, 203 P. 469, 471 (Idaho 1921) (awarding cost of restoring meadow 
damaged by agents of defendant while retrieving logs owned by defendant deposited on meadow 
by a flood); Marks v. Culmer, 24 P. 528, 528 (Utah 1890) (awarding cost of rebuilding a dwelling 
because the defendants had "unlawfully, with force and arms, and with a multitude of people, 
broke and entered ... and forcibly ejected said plaintiff ... and broke the doors and windows 
of, and tore down and destroyed [the property]"). 
47 E.g., Dandoy v. Oswald, 298 P. 1030, 1031 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Roark v. Musgrave, 355 
N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Neb. 1992); 
Threlfall v. Town of Muscoda, 527 N.W.2d 367, 373 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994). 
48 See infra section II.B. 
49 See Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
50 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
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of use would still be available, but are a separate issue not discussed 
in this Comment. 51 
B. The Development of the Personal Reasons Exception and 
Section 929 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Although as a general rule damages for direct injury to real prop-
erty may not significantly exceed diminution in market value, an 
exception has evolved in cases where a landowner has personal rea-
sons for desiring restoration. Section 929 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (Section 929) attests to this development and in many cases 
is cited as persuasive authority for the personal reasons exception.52 
Section 929 echoes the general rule that the standard measure of 
damages for direct injury to real property is the diminution in market 
value.53 In the alternative, Section 929 allows for recovery of restora-
tion damages that are not "disproportionate" to the diminution in 
market value.54 However, Comment b to Section 929 outlines the 
personal reasons exception to the above general rule and allows for 
restoration damages that significantly exceed the diminution in mar-
ket value.55 
During the past century, courts increasingly have awarded resto-
ration damages under the personal reasons exception despite the fact 
that the diminution in market value is known and is significantly less 
than the cost of restoration. 56 These courts have justified such awards, 
51 See supra notes 4-u and accompanying text. 
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929 (1977); see, e.g., Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 
1107, 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07; Board of County Comm'rs 
v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1315 (Colo. 1986). 
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1977). The full text of Section 929 is as 
follows: 
Harm to Land from Past Invasions 
(1) If one is entitled to a judgement for harm to land resulting from a past invasion 
and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation 
for 
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after 
the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been 
or may be reasonably incurred, 
(b) the loss of use of the land, and 
(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant. 
(2) If a thing attached to the land but severable from it is damaged, he may at his 
election recover the loss in value to the thing instead of the damage to the land as a 
whole. 
ld. § 929. 
54 See id. § 929 cmt.b. 
55 See id. 
56 Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr. 193, 197-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
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in general, by noting that in certain cases market diminution damages 
will fail the primary objective of tort damages-to compensate an 
injured landowner fully-when the landowner has significant personal 
reasons for desiring that the property be restored.57 Because the 
actual value of a parcel of real estate to its owner is presumed to be 
equal to its market value, such courts implicitly recognize loss of value 
idiosyncratic to the particular landowner as compensable through an 
award of restoration damages. 
For example, in Worthington v. Roberts, the plaintiff landowners 
sued to recover restoration damages for injury to trees surrounding 
their residence.58 Herbicide sprayed on an adjacent field during a wind 
storm had injured trees on the plaintiffs' property.59 At trial, the 
plaintiffs testified that they had purchased their property in large 
part because of the number and location of trees on the plot and that 
they had located their residence on the plot so as to displace as few 
(holding reasonable $243,539.95 in restoration damages in light of diminution in market value of 
$171,000); Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that restoration 
cost of $19,610 as damages for injury that increased value of land by $5,000 may be found 
reasonable upon remand to trial court); Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 41 (awarding $20,125,000 in restoration damages, for a diminution in market value 
injury of $4,159,000 to residential property with a pre-tort value of $17,500,000). 
The Escamilla case was settled out of court prior to appeal. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, 
at 50. The settlement included an increased "annoyance and discomfort" award of $11,000,000 
and an agreement by ASARCO itself to restore the land. Id. 
57 Roark v. Musgrave, 355 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (stating that restoration damages 
appropriate where landowner held land for use, not sale, according to his tastes and wishes even 
if market value is not diminished); Huber v. Serpico, 176 A.2d 805, 813 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1962) (recognizing that market diminution damages often will fail to compensate landowner 
for injury to property with "peculiar value to the owner"); Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 
619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("If an owner is to be fully compensated for temporary (repairable) 
damage to his property, then what he expects from the use of it is a vital factor."); Thatcher v. 
Lane Constr. Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) ("Where the presence of trees is 
essential to the planned use of property for a homesite in accordance with the tastes and wishes 
of its owner, where not unreasonable ... the owner may be awarded as damages the fair cost 
of restoring his land . . . without necessary limitation to diminution in market value of such 
land."); Gilman v. Brown, 91 N.W. 227, 229 (Wisc. 1902); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1324 
(Wyo. 1984) (recognizing personal reasons exception in Wyoming); cf Elowsky v. Gulf Power 
Co., 172 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) (awarding landowner who worked the night shift 
damages for "loss of enjoyment," but not specifically cost of restoration, of tree which had 
shaded his bedroom window, negligently cut-down by defendant). 
58 Worthington v. Roberts, 803 S.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Ark. 1991). 
A large number of restoration damages cases decided under the personal reasons exception 
have involved injury to trees or shrubbery. See generally Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, 
Measure of Damages for Injury to or Destruction of Shade or Ornamental Tree or Shrub, 95 
A.L.R.3d 508 (1979). 
59 Worthington, 803 S.W.2d at 907-D8. 
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trees as possible.60 The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld jury instruc-
tions allowing consideration of the cost of replacement or repair of the 
trees when determining the amount of the damage award.61 The court 
found such consideration proper under the personal reasons exception 
because of the idiosyncratic value that the plaintiffs attached to the 
injured trees.62 
Likewise, Arizona courts, in certain cases, have allowed for recov-
ery of restoration damages that exceed diminution in market value.63 
In Dixon v. City of Phoenix, for example, construction of a city waterline 
had destroyed vegetation on property that the plaintiff had planned 
to use as a homesite.64 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that because 
the destroyed vegetation "had intrinsic value to the owners for aes-
thetic reasons," an award of reasonable restoration costs was appro-
priate.65 
In Ohio, courts have awarded restoration damages in cases where 
"the owner intends to use the [injured] property for a residence or 
for recreation or for both, according to his personal tastes and wishes 
•••• "66 For instance, in Denoyer v. Lamb, the defendant had de-
stroyed trees on parcels on which the plaintiffs intended to build 
residences.67 The trial court had excluded testimony regarding the 
cost of cleanup and restoration of the property.68 Thus, the jury awarded 
damages based on a stipulation as to the "timber" value of the de-
stroyed trees.69 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded 
the case, ruling that testimony regarding the cost of restoration was 
excluded wrongfully because the plaintiffs had personal reasons for 
desiring restoration.70 
In general, only individuals may recover restoration damages under 
the personal reasons exception.71 However, entities not motivated by 
60 Id. at 907. 
61 Id. at 910. 
62 Id. 
63 Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
64 Id. at 1110. 
65 Id. at 1116-17. 
66 Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); see Thatcher v. Lane Constr. 
Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970). 
67 Denoyer, 490 N.E.2d at 617. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 618. 
7°Id. at 620. 
71 See Regal Constr. Co. v. West Lantham Hills Citizen's Ass'n, 260 A.2d 82, 86 (Md. 1970) 
(suggesting that restoration damages awards under the personal reasons exception are lin1ited 
to actions by individuals). 
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economic gain, such as churches and governments, also have qualified 
for restoration damages awards under the exception.72 
When awarding restoration damages that significantly exceed the 
diminution in market value, courts often have cited favorably to Sec-
tion 929, specifically Comment b to subsection (1), clause (a).73 Com-
ment b qualifies the language of Section 929 that allows, in appropri-
ate cases, for restoration damages "that have been or may reasonably 
be incurred."74 Comment b states, inter alia: 
if a building such as a homestead is used for a purpose personal 
to the owner, the damages ordinarily include an amount for re-
pairs, even though this might be greater than the entire value of 
the building. So, when a garden has been maintained in a city in 
connection with a dwelling house, the owner is entitled to recover 
the expense of putting the garden in its original condition even 
though the market value of the premises has not been decreased 
by the defendant's invasion.75 
Although Comment b outlines situations that may qualify as "appro-
priate cases" under the personal reasons exception, it sheds little light 
on what magnitude of damages will qualify as reasonable under this 
exception.76 
Choosing figures against which to compare the cost of restoration 
when determining reasonableness is a more specific problem courts 
face. In other words, courts must determine the objective dollar amount 
72 See United States v. Sullivan, 1 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding, under Georgia 
law, that cost of replacing wrongfully destroyed trees was the only appropriate measure of 
damages where the trees were on federally owned parkland as part of a larger ecosystem held, 
not for sale, but for the benefit of the general public); Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray 
Beach, 639 So.2d 595, 596-97 (Fla. 1994) (allowing recovery of restoration damages by city 
government under the personal reasons exception for injury to city water supply where alter-
native water sources were both speculative and more costly); Roman Catholic Church v. Lou-
isiana Gas Servo Co., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La. 1993) (holding that restoration damages under the 
personal reasons exception were appropriate where church held the injured property not for 
profit, but for purpose of providing low-income housing); Rector of St. Christopher's Episcopal 
Church v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975) (en banc) (finding restoration 
damages for negligent destruction of trees appropriate under personal reasons exception where 
church maintained the trees for aesthetic purposes). 
73 See, e.g., Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Henniger v. 
Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 
P.2d 1309, 1315 (Colo. 1986). 
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977); cf Newsome v. Billips, 
671 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding in a case not under the personal reasons 
exception that "[t]he option for restoration is nevertheless limited by what is 'reasonable"'). 
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
76 See id. 
1996] RESTORATION DAMAGES 713 
benchmark to be used for this comparison. Possibilities include the 
diminution in market value (the quantifiable injury), the pre-tort mar-
ket value of the entire parcel, or both.77 
Another problem courts face is deciding whether a landowner ac-
tually must spend a restoration damages award on repairs. Section 
929 and its comments do not state specifically that a restoration 
damages award must be used for restoration or even be accompanied 
by a determination that the award is likely to be spent on restora-
tion.78 Do courts have to make such a determination? If not, is there 
potential for an unjustified economic windfall in favor of a landowner 
at the expense of a tort defendant?79 
A restoration damages award may appear fair and reasonable in 
the typical case involving a relatively minor injury to real property 
used for homestead80 purposes and not for simple economic gain, 
because landowners' right to use their property according to their 
tastes and wishes is a significant right worthy of protection.81 Today, 
however, this line of reasoning has been used to justify restoration 
damages for environmental cleanup costs that greatly exceed the 
diminution in market value of the real property.82 
III. WHEN ARE RESTORATION DAMAGES THAT EXCEED THE 
DIMINUTION IN MARKET VALUE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE 
PERSONAL REASONS EXCEPTION?83 
Although no state has rejected the personal reasons exception spe-
cifically, the determination of when an award of restoration damages 
is proper is a subject of significant controversy.84 All states that have 
considered this matter utilize some variation of a three-part test to 
determine whether a landowner qualifies for the personal reasons 
exception.85 This test essentially boils down to the following three 
77 See infra section III.C. 
78 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.h (1977). 
79 See infra section III.B. 
80 In this Comment, "homestead" means real property used as the personal residence of the 
owner. 
8! See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
82 Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 41. 
83 This section of this Comment owes much to a law review article on construction contract 
damages, a section of which surveyed real property injury cases decided under Section 929. 
Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the Measure of Damages 
for Construction Contracts, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1445, 1480--90 (1991). 
84 See infra sections III.A-III.C. 
85 Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); 
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inquiries: 1) Does the landowner have personal reasons for desiring 
restoration? 2) Is an award of restoration damages likely to be spent 
on restoration? 3) Is the cost of restoration reasonable?86 However, 
states vary significantly in the application of this test, specifically as 
to the evidence required to show the existence of personal reasons, 
the likelihood that damages will be spent on restoration, and the 
method for determining the reasonableness of a restoration damages 
award.87 
A. When Does a Landowner Qualify for the 
Personal Reasons Exception? 
The only use of land mentioned in the comments to Section 929 
qualifying a landowner for the personal reasons exception is use for 
homestead purposes.88 Injury to real property used for commercial 
purposes generally cannot qualify for restoration damages under the 
personal reasons exception.89 In actual cases, homestead use is the 
primary use of real property that supports the idiosyncratic value 
that justifies landowners receiving restoration damages under the 
personal reasons exception.90 In some cases, planned future use as a 
homesite or use for personal recreational purposes has justified res-
toration damages under the personal reasons exception.9! However, 
the evidentiary burden placed on landowners to show the existence 
Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 323 A.2d 906, 911 (N.H. 1974); see, e.g., Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 
845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Worthington v. Roberts, 803 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Ark. 
1991); Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1316-17 (Colo. 1986). 
86 Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 196; Moulton, 323 A.2d at 911; see, e.g., Dixon, 845 P.2d at 1117; 
Worthington, 803 S.W.2d at 910; Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1316-17. 
87 See infra sections III.A-III.C. 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
89 See, e.g., Clark v. J.w. Conner & Sons, 441 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
intention to build residential duplexes on injured real property does not qualify as a personal 
reason), review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984); Reeser v. Weaver Bros., 605 N.E.2d 1271, 1278 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (denying restoration damages for injury to real property used for commer-
cial purposes despite the fact that landowner maintained residence on adjacent property). But 
see G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379, 1386-87 (Alaska 1974) 
(granting restoration damages, without separate determination of diminution in market value, 
because of landowner's plans to use the property both for profit and as an arboretum to benefit 
the general public). 
90 See, e.g., Worthington, 803 S.W.2d at 910; Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 196; Moulton, 323 A.2d 
at 911. But see McKinney v. Christiana Community Builders, 280 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1991). 
91 Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1315 n.5 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Samson 
Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 147 A.2d 430, 437 (Md. 1958) ("It would seem to be enough [to 
qualify for restoration damages] if the land injured is suitable and available for a homesite, and 
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of idiosyncratic value justifying an award of restoration damages 
under the personal reasons exception varies from state to state. 
To qualify for the personal reasons exception, several states require 
that landowners make an evidentiary showing, beyond simple per-
sonal use, that the value of their property is enhanced by idiosyncratic 
value.92 For example, in Henniger v. Dunn, the defendant had bull-
dozed a road seven-tenths of a mile onto the plaintiff's property, 
destroying 225 non-ornamental trees and vegetative undergrowth.93 
The injury was to an area of unimproved land that was part of a larger 
plot that the owner used for homestead purposes.94 As a result of the 
new road, the entire parcel actually increased in market value from 
$179,000 to $184,000.95 The plaintiff sued to recover the cost of resto-
ration and presented evidence that it would cost more than $221,000 
to restore the lost trees and vegetative undergrowth.96 Alternatively, 
is held for that purpose by the owner."); Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Neb. 
1992); Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
92 See, e.g., Maloof v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Md. 1965) (holding landowner's 
intention to utilize property as a shrine to the first President of the United States under the 
Articles of Confederation and for the congregation of artists sufficient to qualify for personal 
reasons exception); Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that restoration damages for injury to landscaping are appropriate where the landscaping is 
shown to have had "intrinsic" value to the landowner); Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 
109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that landowner's desire to maintain property in its original 
condition was sufficient to qualify for personal reasons exception); Samson Constr. Co., 147 A.2d 
at 436 (stating that restoration damages were appropriate where owners purchased undevel-
oped real property for future use as home sites because of the beauty of the property); Leavitt 
v. Continental Tel. Co., 559 A.2d 786, 788 (Me. 1989) (finding restoration damages proper if 
injured property has "unique value to the owners"); Morris v. Ciborowski, 311 A.2d 296, 299 
(N.H. 1973) (per curiam) (ruling that restoration damages that exceed diminution in market 
value may be awarded where there is substantial evidence of personal reasons for desiring 
repair); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 181 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. 1962); Thatcher v. Lane Constr. 
Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970); Pehrson v. Saderup, 498 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1972) 
(finding restoration damages not appropriate because plaintiff failed to show that injured lilac 
hedge was essential to planned use of the land as a private residence); see Worthington, 803 
S.W.2d at 910; Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317-18; Zwick v. Simpson, 572 P.2d 133, 134 (Colo. 1977); 
Bangert v. Osceola County, 456 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 1990). 
93 Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 106. In Henniger, damages for injury to real property were 
based on California Civil Code section 3333, which essentially restates the purpose of common 
law tort damages: "[fJor the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of 
damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will 
compensate for all of the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been 
anticipated or not." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970). 
94 Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 106. 
95Id. 
96 See id. 
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the plaintiff presented evidence that the cost of restoring the vegeta-
tive undergrowth alone would cost $19,610.97 
In its ruling in Henniger, the California Court of Appeal, First 
District, Division 4 stated that the measure of damages for injury to 
land generally is the lesser of the cost of restoration or the diminution 
in market value.98 The court did note, however, that other jurisdictions 
have awarded restoration costs exceeding the diminution in market 
value, even if there is no diminution but an appreciation in value, if 
"there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original 
condition [of the property]."99 Thus, the court required a showing that 
the property is enhanced by idiosyncratic value in order to qualify for 
restoration damages. lOo The court outlined a three-part test to deter-
mine whether to award restoration damages in a particular case.lOl 
The test first requires the landowner to present evidence that the 
landowner has personal reasons for desiring restoration.lo2 Next, a 
court must determine whether a damage award will be used for 
restoration, and whether the cost of restoration is reasonable under 
the circumstances.lo3 
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1 recently 
applied this test in Orndorff v. Christiana Community Buildersl04 and 
McKinney v. Christiana Community Builders.105 These cases each 
involved injury to homestead property developed by the defendant 
as part of larger subdivisions.106 Despite the many similarities in the 
two cases,107 the court held that the plaintiffs in Orndorffwere eligible 
for restoration damages under the personal reasons exception, while 
the McKinney plaintiffs were not.108 The plaintiffs in Orndorff tes-
97 See id. 
98ld. 
99 Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b 
(1977)). 
100 See id. at 109. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. See also infra sections III.B & III.C for further discussion of the latter two inquiries 
of this test. 
104 266 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
105 280 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). McKinney v. Christiana Community Builders was 
not officially reported in California Appellate Reports and, therefore, may not be cited according 
to the California Rules of Court. See CAL. R. CT. 976, 977, 979. 
106 McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 243; see Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 194. 
107 Including the fact that both sets of plaintiffs were represented by the same law firm. See 
McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 243; Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 194. 
108 McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 246; Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 196. 
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tified that they had purchased the home because of adjacent open 
space and also expressed a desire to restore their land and continue 
to live in their home.109 The court in Orndorff stated that to qualify 
for the personal reasons exception, "all that is required is some per-
sonal use by [the owner] and a bona fide desire to repair or restore."110 
The plaintiffs in Orndorff satisfied this requirement.lll 
In McKinney, by contrast, the plaintiffs did not present substantial 
evidence to qualify them for the personal reasons exception justifying 
an award of restoration damages.1l2 In fact, there was evidence that 
the plaintiffs' primary purpose for holding the property, beyond use 
as a residence, was to realize profits from rising property values, thus 
eliminating the possibility of significant compensable idiosyncratic 
value.na In denying restoration damages in McKinney, the court im-
plicitly determined that market diminution damages compensated the 
plaintiffs fully for the injury to their land and that the property was 
not enhanced by idiosyncratic value.1l4 
In some states, the use of real property for homestead purposes, 
without any additional evidentiary showing of idiosyncratic value, 
appears to be sufficient to trigger the personal reasons exception.1l5 
This line of cases switches the presumption from one that the market 
value equals the actual value of the property to the owner, to one that 
property used for homestead purposes is enhanced by idiosyncratic 
value.1l6 In other words, the cases switch the presumption to one that 
the actual value of the property to the owner exceeds its market 
value. 
109 OrndarjJ, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95. 
l1°Id. at 196. 
111 Id. 
112 McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 246. 
113Id. at 243. 
114 See id. at 246. 
115 See Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 44 (Colorado case); 
Matich v. Gerdes, 550 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("[W]hen the damaged property gains 
its principal value from personal use, rather than that for pecuniary gain, the loss in market 
value is a poor gauge of damage."); Myers v. Arnold, 403 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(finding that where real property is held for personal use, not economic gain, reasonable 
restoration costs are appropriate); Zosky v. Couri, 397 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) 
(holding that where defendant's truck left tire ruts on plaintiffs front lawn, restoration damages 
award is justified); Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that 
"when the owner intends to use the property for a residence or for both, according to his 
personal tastes and wishes, the owner is not limited to the diminution in value"). 
116 See Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 44; Matich, 550 N.E.2d 
at 626; Myers, 403 N.E.2d at 321; Zosky, 397 N.E.2d at 171; Denoyer, 490 N.E.2d at 618. 
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Illustrative of this line of reasoning is Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., 
a Colorado class action suit brought by 567 neighborhood residents 
against a nearby industrial plant.l17 Pollution from the plant caused 
soil in the neighborhood to be contaminated with arsenic and cad-
mium.us In awarding restoration damages in Escamilla, the Colorado 
District Court for the City and County of Denver discussed no evi-
dence beyond simple residential use to suggest that the property 
involved had any idiosyncratic value to the landowners individually 
or as a groUp.119 The Escamilla court applied the restoration damages 
rules defined by the Colorado Supreme Court in two prior cases.120 
The test expressed in Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek and 
Zwick v. Simpson does not explicitly require that a landowner show 
that injured property used for homestead purposes is enhanced by 
idiosyncratic value to qualify for restoration damages.121 Thus, Colo-
rado courts may presume that such a landowner qualifies for the 
personal reasons exception without any further evidence. 
B. Must an Award of Restoration Damages Be 
Spent on Restoration? 
The second inquiry of the standard three-part test for the personal 
reasons exception is whether a restoration damages award is likely 
to be spent on restoration.l22 The text and comments of Section 929, 
upon which an award of restoration damages under the personal 
reasons exception often relies, do not explicitly state whether such an 
award must be spent on restoration.123 However, one can read Section 
929 to require a finding that restoration damages are likely to be spent 
117 See Escamilla v. ASARCa, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 43-44; Colorado Court 
to Decide Amount of Damages After City Residents Prevail Against ASARCa, 23 Env't Rep. 
(BNA), No. 48, at 3052 (Mar. 26,1993). 
118 Escamilla v. ASARCa, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 41. 
119 See id. at 43-44. Another problem not addressed by the court in Escamilla is that, even 
presuming the presence of idiosyncratic value on the part of owners who resided in these 
residences, the personal reasons exception under Section 929 presumably would not have 
applied to any of the 567 class members who may have owned property for rental income 
purposes in the injured area. See Newsome v. Billips, 671 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) 
(denying restoration damages to owner of rental property not held for personal use). 
120 Escamilla v. ASARCa, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 42-44; see Board of County 
Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1315-16 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Zwick v. Simpson, 572 P.2d 
133, 134 (Colo. 1977). 
121 See Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1315-16; Zwick, 572 P.2d at 134. 
122 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). 
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on restoration as the language of the text and comments refers to 
"costs for repair."l24 In addition, nearly every court that has consid-
ered the matter will not award restoration damages if there is evi-
dence that the landowner will not use the damages for restoration.125 
Many courts adhere to this general position and require evidence 
that restoration damages are likely to be spent on restoration before 
a plaintiff can qualify for restoration damages under the personal 
reasons exception.126 If such enhanced damages were not likely to 
be spent on restoration, courts reason, restoration damages would 
be an unjustified windfall to the landowner at the defendant's ex-
pense.127 
For example, California courts apparently require that a landowner 
present evidence that a restoration damages award will be spent on 
restoration.l28 Illustrative of this rule are the California cases of Orn-
dorff v. Christiana Community Builders and McKinney v. Chris-
tiana Community Builders.l29 In Orndorff, the court found evidence 
that restoration was likely and awarded restoration damages under 
124 See id. 
125 These courts are making an implicit determination that such a landowner has no claim to 
damages equal to the cost of restoration, only a claim to the monetary means to effect restora-
tion of the land. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676-77 (lst Cir. 1980) 
(denying $5.5 million in restoration damages based on the replacement cost for 92 million sea 
creatures destroyed in an oil spill because the plaintiff did not contemplate actual replacement 
and, thus, the award would be an unjustified windfall), cert. denied,450 U.S. 912 (1981); McKin-
ney v. Christiana Community Builders, 280 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (denying 
restoration damages because landowner presented no evidence of personal reasons and there 
was evidence that the property was held for profit); Zwick v. Simpson, 551 P.2d 216, 218 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1976) (finding restoration damages inappropriate because plaintiff already had sold the 
injured property and, thus, restoration by plaintiff was not possible), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 572 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) 
& cmt.b (1977). But see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., 625 A.2d 601, 609 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (stating, in dictum, in an insurance coverage case that a tort claimant 
who receives restoration damages under Section 929 is not obliged to restore the injured 
property). 
126 SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 676-77; see Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980) (stating that landowner qualified for personal reasons exception because there 
was evidence that restoration was likely to occur). But see Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 535--37 (Mass. 1987) (holding that church was entitled to a 
percentage of total future reconstruction cost, despite no immediate plans for reconstruction of 
the church, because injury to the property had hastened the day when reconstruction would be 
necessary). 
127 See SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 676-77; McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 245; Zwick, 551 
P.2d at 218. 
128 See McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 245; Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. 
Rptr. 193, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
129 McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 242; Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
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the personal reasons exception.130 However, in McKinney, the court 
found that the property was held primarily for profit and implicitly 
held that restoration likely would not occur.131 
Courts in other states also suggest, but do not explicitly state, that 
they must determine whether restoration damages are likely to be 
spent on restoration.132 However, these courts do not discuss whether 
a party seeking restoration damages must present affirmative evi-
dence that actual restoration is intended.133 For example, in Colorado, 
unless there is evidence to the contrary, courts apparently presume 
that a landowner who qualifies for the personal reasons exception is 
likely to spend restoration damages on restoration.l34 
C. Upper Limits to an Award of Restoration Damages Under 
the Personal Reasons Exception 
A court will award restoration damages, whether or not under the 
personal reasons exception, only if the award is reasonable under the 
circumstances.l35 In a case not under the personal reasons exception, 
the reasonableness of the cost of restoration is determined by com-
parison to the diminution in market value.136 In such a case, the cost 
of restoration is unreasonable if it significantly exceeds the pre-tort 
market value of the property, as total diminution in market value can 
never exceed the pre-tort value.137 As a result, an award of restoration 
damages in such a case is subject to an upper limit of the pre-tort 
market value of the property.l38 Courts reason that it would be unjust 
to allow landowners to recover damages that exceed the amount they 
130 Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 194-96. 
131 McKinney, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 243-45. 
132 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1315 (Colo. 1986) (en bane); Keitges 
v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Neb. 1992). 
133 See Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1315; Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 143. 
134 See Zwick v. Simpson, 551 P.2d 216, 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 572 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1977); see generally Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in 
PLATER ET AL., supra note 6 (failing to discuss issue). 
135 See supra notes 31-36 & 73-77 and accompanying text. 
136 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bohlin, 75 So. 697, 700 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917); Bangert v. Osceola County, 
456 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 1990); Hopkins v. American Pneumatic Servo Co., 80 N.E. 624, 624 
(Mass. 1907); Baillon v. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 235 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Minn. 1975); Hueston v. 
Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 79 N.W. 92, 93 (Minn. 1899). 
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929 & cmt.b (1977). 
138 See, e.g., Jackson, 75 So. at 700; Bangert, 456 N.W.2d at 190; Hopkins, 80 N.E. at 624; 
Baillon, 235 N.W.2d at 614; Hueston, 79 N.W. at 93. 
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would receive if their property were completely destroyed or taken 
by eminent domain.139 
However, landowners who qualify for the personal reasons excep-
tion are not subject to this mechanical upper limit and may recover 
restoration damages that exceed the pre-tort market value of their 
property.140 Where a landowner qualifies for the personal reasons 
exception, many states require only that a restoration damages award 
be reasonable in relation to some objective benchmark associated with 
the property.141 In other words, these states require that restoration 
damages not unreasonably exceed the chosen objective benchmark. 
For example, some states require that the cost of restoration be 
reasonable in relation to the pre-tort market value of the land.142 
Others utilize the diminution in market value (i.e. the extent of di-
rect injury) as the objective benchmark.143 Other states look to both 
figures when determining the reasonableness of the restoration cost.144 
Still other states do not explicitly utilize a specific objective bench-
mark, but simply require that an award be "practical" or "reason-
able."145 
Comment b to Section 929, which establishes the personal reasons 
exception, does not state what, if anything, is the upper limit of a 
restoration damages award under the exception.146 Although there is 
no stated mechanical limit to a restoration damages award, any award 
139 See, e.g., Jackson, 75 So. at 700; Bangert, 456 N.W.2d at 190; Hopkins, 80 N.E. at 624; 
Baillon, 235 N.W.2d at 614; Hueston, 79 N.W. at 93. 
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
141 Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Henniger v. Dunn, 162 
Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 
(Colo. 1986) (en banc); Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45-46; 
Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana Gas Servo Co., 618 So.2d 874, 879-80 (La. 1993); Keitges V. 
VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Neb. 1992); Moulton V. Groveton Papers Co., 323 A.2d 906, 
911 (N.H. 1974). 
142 See Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317 (holding that cost of restoration must not be "wholly unrea-
sonable" in relation to pre-tort value); Escamilla V. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 45-46; Louisiana Gas Servo Co., 618 So.2d at 879-80; Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 143 
("evidence relating to the land's diminution in value has no relevance" to a restoration damages 
award under the personal reasons exception). 
143 Dixon, 845 P.2d at 1117; Moulton, 323 A.2d at 91l. 
144 Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
145 Maloofv. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Md. 1965) (stating that under the personal 
reasons exception diminution in market value is "wholly inapplicable" and the measure of 
damages is simply "the reasonable cost of restoring the property as nearly as reasonably 
possible to [its pre-tort condition]"); Thatcher v. Lane Constr. Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1970) (stating that restoration must be "practical" and costs not unreasonable). 
146 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
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is still bound by the language of Section 929 that requires that the 
cost of restoration be reasonable under the circumstances of the case.147 
Comment b to Section 929 specifically states that if a personal dwell-
ing is injured, an award of restoration damages may exceed the pre-
tort market value of the dwelling.l48 Thus, because a restoration dam-
ages award under Section 929 always must be reasonable, the personal 
reasons exception only expands the range of what is reasonable, 
allowing recovery that significantly exceeds diminution in market 
value and even the pre-tort market value of the property.149 
Illustrative of cases that utilize both the pre-tort market value and 
the extent of injury when determining the reasonableness of the cost 
of restoration is Henniger v. Dunn.15o In Henniger, the California 
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, stated that a court may 
award restoration damages under the personal reasons exception only 
if such an award is "not unreasonable in relation to [both] the damage 
inflicted and the value of the land prior to the [injury]."151 The Hen-
niger court held that the $241,000 cost of restoration was a "mani-
festly unreasonable expense in relation to the value of the land prior 
to the trespass [$179,000]."152 However, the court did not so rule as to 
the $19,610 cost of restoring the vegetative undergrowth and re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine if such an award would 
be reasonable and just.153 
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, consid-
ered the same issue in the Orndorff case.154 In that case, the court 
examined whether restoration damages totaling $243,539.95 were rea-
sonable under the personal reasons exception for a diminution in 
market value injury of $171,000 to property with a pre-tort market 
value of $238,500.155 The court first determined that the total cost of 
restoration was "well within reason" because the cost was just 2.5% 
more than the pre-tort market value of the property.156 The Orndorff 
147 See Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating, after a multi-state 
survey of restoration damages awards under the personal reasons exception, "[a]ll cases, it is 
to be noted, stress the overall limitation of reasonableness, a concept well established in 
American jurisprudence"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) (1977). 
148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
149 See Denoyer, 490 N.E.2d at 620; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt.b (1977). 
150 Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
151 [d. at 109. 
152 [d. at 106, 109. 
153 [d. at 109. 
154 Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr. 193, 197-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
155 [d. 
156 [d. at 197-98. 
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court then compared the cost of restoration with the diminution in 
market value injury.157 The court, however, did not make a numerical 
comparison between the cost of restoration and the extent ofinjury.158 
The court simply stated that "where, as here, the damage to a home 
has deprived it of most of its value, an award of substantial repair 
costs is appropriate."159 Thus, although California courts require that 
the restoration cost be reasonable in relation to both the pre-tort 
market value of the property and the diminution in market value, the 
comparison to the pre-tort market value apparently is the most sig-
nificant inquiry.160 
In contrast to California, Colorado courts assess the reasonableness 
of a restoration damage award only in relation to a property's pre-tort 
market value.l61 For example, in Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., the 
injury inflicted diminished the market value of all of the property 
involved from $17.5 million to $13.4 million-a total diminution of $4.1 
million.162 When considering reasonableness, the Escamilla court only 
compared the $20 million cost of restoration with the $17.5 million 
pre-tort market value of the land and did not consider the diminu-
tion in market value.163 The court determined that, based on this 
single comparison, such an award of restoration damages was reason-
able.164 
On the other hand, Arizona and New Hampshire courts, in cases 
under the personal reasons exception, utilize diminution in market 
value as the objective benchmark for determining the reasonableness 
of a restoration damages award.165 This is the same benchmark used 
by all states in real property injury cases not under the personal 
reasons exception.166 In Dixon v. City of Phoenix, for example, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that in real property injury cases 
under the personal reasons exception, restoration damages are recov-
erable when the "cost [is] not unreasonable in relation to the dam-
157 Id. at 198. 
158 Id. 
159 Orndorff, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 198. 
160 See id. 
161 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986) (en bane) (holding 
that cost of restoration must not be "wholly unreasonable" in relation to pre-tort market value); 
Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45-46. 
162 Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45. 
163 Id. at 45-46. 
164 Id. 
165 Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Moulton v. Groveton 
Papers Co., 323 A.2d 906, 911 (N.H. 1974). 
166 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
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age inflicted."167 Likewise, the New Hampshire Supreme Court spe-
cifically has adopted Section 929, allowing for restoration damages 
under the personal reasons exception and requires that such damages 
not be "disproportionate to the actual injury."I68 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE VARYING STANDARDS FOR THE 
AWARD OF RESTORATION DAMAGES UNDER 
THE PERSONAL REASONS EXCEPTION 
A. Of Course I Have Personal Reasons for Desiring a 
Larger Damages Award. Who Doesn't? 
As a threshold test under the personal reasons exception, California 
requires a landowner to present evidence that the landowner has 
personal reasons for desiring restoration.169 This requirement works 
to provide full compensation for losses while avoiding undue windfall. 
Essentially, the California approach maintains the standard presump-
tion in real property injury cases that diminution in market value 
equals the actual extent of direct injury to the landowner.17o Thus, the 
actual value of real property to its owner is presumed not to be 
enhanced by value idiosyncratic to the owner regardless of the owner's 
use of the property.l71 In California, however, this is a rebuttable 
presumption.l72 To rebut this presumption, a landowner must present 
evidence that the landowner has ''bona fide" personal reasons for 
desiring restoration.173 
In contrast, the Colorado approach automatically presumes the 
existence of idiosyncratic value when real property is used for home-
stead or personal recreation purposes.174 Thus, Colorado courts pre-
sume that owners of such property possess personal reasons for de-
siring restoration.175 In Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, 
the Colorado Supreme Court hinted that a tort plaintiff may rebut 
167 Dixon, 845 P.2d at 1117. 
168 Moulton, 323 A.2d at 911. 
169 See Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
170 See id. at 106, 109. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 109. 
173 Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, 266 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
174 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1315 n.5 (Colo. 1986) (en bane); 
Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 44. 
175 See Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1315 n.5; Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 
6, at 44. 
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this presumption, but did not articulate the amount of evidence that 
would be required.I76 
The Colorado cases do not provide any justification for switching 
the presumption that diminution in market value of an injured prop-
erty is equal to the actual extent of injury to the landowner.I77 This 
switch appears unjustified when one considers that existing single-
family homes in the United States have an annual turnover rate of 
approximately 4.35%.178 In other words, one out of every twenty to 
twenty-five single-family homes is sold each year. A significant por-
tion of these homes presumably is sold on a voluntaryI79 basis. It must 
be presumed that landowners who voluntarily sell their homestead 
land were compensated fully by the market price of their property.I80 
Otherwise, a rational voluntary seller would refuse to sell at the 
current market price. Because the Colorado approach does not pro-
vide any reason for switching this presumption, the California ap-
proach regarding the applicability of the personal reasons exception 
appears to be the more rational approach. 
B. Trust Me. On What Else Would I Spend My 
Restoration Damages Award? 
As discussed, the second inquiry for the standard three-part test 
under the personal reasons exception is whether the restoration award 
is likely to be spent on restoration.I81 This inquiry goes hand-in-hand 
with the inquiry into whether the landowner has personal reasons for 
desiring restoration. Both inquiries work to prevent the possibility of 
an undue windfall while granting landowners who intend to restore 
property the means to do SO.I82 
The California approach requires that a landowner present evi-
dence that restoration damages granted under the personal reasons 
176 See Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1315--16. 
177 See id.; Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 43-44. 
178 More than 3.2 million existing single-family homes (not new construction) were sold in the 
United States during 1990. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 732 (1994) (table no. 1208). The total single-family housing stock, including 
mobile homes, was 73.4 million in 1990. [d. at 735 (table no. 1214). 
179 In this context, voluntary is meant to mean homes sold for reasons other than financial 
hardship or other immediate necessity. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., _ U.S. _,114 S. 
Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text which relates to BFP's 
discussion of the relationship between a voluntary sale and market price. 
180 BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761. 
181 See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 31-36, 56-57, 126-27 and accompanying text. 
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exception will be spent on repair. l83 This is not an undue burden when 
one considers that such a landowner has no claim to damages equal 
to the cost of restoration, only a claim to the monetary means to effect 
restoration of the land.l84 
In contrast, the Colorado approach does not appear to require an 
affirmative showing that restoration damages likely are to be spent 
on repair.185 However, the Colorado Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that an award of restoration damages has the potential to provide an 
undue windfall to the landowner and that courts must guard against 
this occurrence.186 Colorado creates, in effect, a rebuttable presump-
tion that a landowner will spend restoration damages on restoration 
if that landowner has personal reasons for desiring restoration in the 
first place.187 Apparently, the amount by which the cost of restoration 
exceeds the diminution in market value does not affect this presump-
tion.lss In Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., for example, the Colorado 
District Court for the City and County of Denver made no inquiry 
into whether a restoration damages award was likely to be spent on 
repair.189 Thus, the Escamilla court appears to have adhered to a 
presumption that such an award was likely to be spent on repair. l90 
The Escamilla decision granted the injured landowners slightly more 
than $20 million in restoration damages for an injury that resulted in 
slightly more than a $4 million diminution in market value.l9l It is 
questionable whether this was a justifiable award when one considers 
that if the landowners were to sell their property and simply retain 
the restoration damages, the landowners would realize a collective 
windfall of nearly $16 million.192 
The California approach, which requires a showing that restoration 
damages are likely to be spent on repair, is a more sound approach 
than that used in Colorado. The California requirement is not a sig-
183 See Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
184 See supra notes 28--30, 124 and accompanying text. 
185 See Zwick v. Simpson, 551 P.2d 216, 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 572 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1977); see generally Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in 
PLATER ET AL., supra note 6 (failing to discuss issue). 
186 Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986). 
187 See Zwick, 551 P.2d at 218; see generally Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., 
supra note 6 (failing to discuss issue). 
188 See generally Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6 (failing to 
discuss issue). 
189 See generally id. 
190 See generally id. 
191 See id. at 41. In addition, the order granted the landowners $8 million in consequential 
damages for "annoyance and discomfort." Id. 
192 See id. 
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nificant evidentiary burden when one considers that landowners have 
no claim to restoration damages under the personal reasons exception 
unless the damages are to be spent on restoration.193 In addition, this 
simple inquiry has the effect of reducing the likelihood of undue 
windfall to landowners who recover restoration damages and do not 
undertake restoration.194 
C. Everything is Relative, Just Make Sure You Use 
the Larger Numbers! 
The third and most complicated inquiry of the three-part test for 
the personal reasons exception is the determination of whether a 
restoration damages award is reasonable under the circumstances.195 
Section 929 states that the reasonableness of a restoration damages 
award for real property injury cases not under the personal reasons 
exception must be assessed in relation to the objective benchmark of 
the diminution in market value.1OO Currently, there are a variety of 
approaches to the reasonableness determination under the personal 
reasons exception in different states using different objective bench-
marks.197 Use of different objective benchmarks has the potential of 
producing dissimilar results in similar situations in different states.198 
A damage award that appears reasonable when compared to one 
193 See supra notes 28--30, 124 and accompanying text. 
194 See McKinney v. Christiana Community Builders, 280 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (denying restoration damages to landowners who presented no evidence of personal 
reasons or that repairs would be made, and there was evidence that the landowners held the 
property primarily for economic gain). 
195 See supra section III.C. 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). 
197 See Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
restoration damages must be reasonable in relation to the "damage inflicted"); Henniger v. 
Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that restoration damages must be 
reasonable in relation to both the diminution in market value and the pre-tort market value of 
the property); Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) 
(holding that cost of restoration must not be "wholly unreasonable" in relation to pre-tort 
market value); Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45-46 (assessing 
reasonableness in relation to property's pre-tort market value); Roman Catholic Church v. 
Louisiana Gas Servo Co., 618 So.2d 874, 879-80 (La. 1993) (assessing reasonableness in relation 
to property's pre-tort market value); Maloofv. United States, 242 F. Supp.175, 183 (D. Md. 1965) 
(stating that, under the personal reasons exception, diminution in market value is "wholly 
inapplicable" and the measure of damages is simply "the reasonable cost of restoring the 
property as nearly as reasonably possible to [its pre-tort condition]"); Moulton V. Groveton 
Papers Co., 323 A2d 906, 911 (N.H. 1974) (assessing reasonableness in relation to diminution in 
market value); Thatcher V. Lane Constr. Co., 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (stating 
that restoration must be "practical" and costs not unreasonable). 
198 See infra discussion section IV.C (paragraph giving examples of this proposition). 
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objective benchmark could appear entirely unreasonable when com-
pared to a different objective benchmark. 
The California approach requires that the cost of restoration under 
the personal reasons exception be reasonable in relation to both the 
diminution in market value and the pre-tort market value of the 
land.199 The first requirement, that the cost of restoration be reason-
able in relation to the diminution in market value, is the same require-
ment imposed in cases not under the personal reasons exception.2°O 
The personal reasons exception simply adjusts the range of what is a 
reasonable cost of restoration under the circumstances.201 
The second requirement in California, that the cost of restoration 
be reasonable in comparison to the pre-tort market value of the prop-
erty, is troublesome. Pre-tort market value has no relationship to the 
measurable injury sustained by the landowner (Le., diminution in 
market value). Pre-tort market value never is used as an objective 
benchmark for determining reasonableness in cases not under the 
personal reasons exception.202 California courts give no justification 
for the addition of this objective benchmark under the personal rea-
sons exception, nor do they give any explanation for the relevance of 
the pre-tort market value of the property in determining reasonable-
ness.203 In addition, California courts enhance the significance of this 
second requirement by making it the primary of the two compari-
sons.204 
In Orndorff v. Christiana Community Builders, the California Court 
of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, applied the third inquiry of the 
personal reasons exception-the reasonableness of the award-to a 
case involving injury to homestead property enhanced by idiosyn-
cratic value.205 In Orndorff, the court first found the cost of restoration 
to be reasonable after a numerical comparison with the pre-tort mar-
ket value of the property.206 This comparison would have been less 
significant if followed by a meaningful numerical comparison between 
the cost of restoration and the diminution in market value. The Orn-
199 Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
200 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). 
201 See id. 
202 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
203 See Henniger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
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dorff court, however, made only a cursory comparison and simply 
determined that, in cases of significant injury, substantial restoration 
damages are justified.207 This leaves the comparison between the pre-
tort market value and the cost of restoration as the only meaningful 
objective comparison in California-again, a comparison that has no 
relation to the plaintiff's measurable injury (Le., diminution in market 
value).208 
This focus on the pre-tort market value of the property and the 
relative insignificance of the extent of injury is even more apparent 
under the Colorado approach.209 In Board of County Commissioners 
v. Slovek, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the reasonableness 
of a restoration damages award under the personal reasons exception 
must be assessed in relation to the pre-tort market value of the land.210 
The court made no mention of diminution in market value as being a 
meaningful figure for use as an objective benchmark.211 The Colorado 
Supreme Court gave no justification for switching the objective bench-
mark of the reasonableness inquiry from the diminution in market 
value to the pre-tort market value of the property.212 
The Colorado District Court for the City and County of Denver 
applied the Slovek rule in Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc.213 In Escamilla, 
the court determined that a $20 million restoration cost was reason-
able in relation to a $17.5 million pre-tort market value of the prop-
erty.214 The court made no inquiry into whether the $20 million resto-
ration damages award was reasonable in relation to the approximately 
$4 million diminution in market value.215 Escamilla is a good example 
of how this switch in focus of the reasonableness inquiry from dimi-
nution in market value to the pre-tort market value of the property has 
the potential to give dissimilar results in similar situations. Awarding 
restoration damages that exceed the objective benchmark by 14.29%, 
as was the case in Escamilla, when using pre-tort market value as 
the benchmark, appears to be reasonable.216 However, considering 
207 [d. at 198. 
208 See id. at 197-98. 
209 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Colo. 1986) (en bane); 
Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45-46. 
210 Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 Escamilla V. ASARCO, Inc., in PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45-46. 
214 [d. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. at 41. 
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that the cost of restoration in Escamilla exceeded the diminution in 
market value by nearly 500%, for a total potential windfall of approxi-
mately $16 million, such an award appears less reasonable.217 Thus, if 
the Escamilla court had applied the test used in Arizona or New 
Hampshire/Is or perhaps even that used in California,219 it might have 
found the cost of restoration unreasonable and therefore refused to 
grant restoration damages. 
Focusing on the pre-tort market value of real property in cases 
under the personal reasons exception could work to the detriment of 
owners of smaller parcels and parcels with a lower total market value. 
For example, consider a situation where two landowners own side-
by-side parcels with similar market value per acre, with one owning 
a two-acre parcel and the other a one-acre parcel. If both landowners 
were to receive similar injuries to their property with equal cleanup 
costs, under both the California and Colorado approaches, the owner 
of the two-acre parcel might be entitled to receive twice the amount 
of damages of the owner of the one-acre parcel because of the higher 
pre-tort market value of the two-acre parcel-the objective bench-
mark used to determine reasonableness. This would also be the result 
in a case involving two otherwise substantially similar parcels where 
one parcel has a per-acre market value of twice that of the other. In 
other words, what might appear to be a reasonable award of restora-
tion damages for a larger or more expensive parcel could be unrea-
sonable for a smaller or less expensive parcel. Despite similar injuries, 
the objective benchmark used to determine the reasonableness of a 
restoration damages award for the larger or more expensive parcel is 
twice that of the smaller or less expensive parcel. 
Thus, the California approach to this third inquiry, modified by the 
removal of any reference to the pre-tort market value of the property, 
like the approach used in Arizona and New Hampshire, is most likely 
to lead to more consistent results to the benefit of all landowners. The 
217 See id. 
218 Arizona and New Hampshire courts use diminution in market value as the objective 
benchmark for determining reasonableness under the personal reasons exception. Dixon v. City 
of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 323 A.2d 
906, 911 (N.H. 1974). See supra notes 165--68 and accompanying text. 
219 California uses both diminution in market value and pre-tort market value as objective 
benchmarks for determining reasonableness under the personal reasons exception. Henniger v. 
Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See supra notes 150--60, 196-204 and 
accompanying text. 
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purpose oftort damages is to compensate injured landowners for their 
10sses.22o Of course, this is also the purpose of restoration damages 
under thE- personal reasons exception.221 Under the personal reasons 
exception, courts must determine whether, given the landowner's 
personal reasons for desiring restoration and the diminution in mar-
ket value resulting from the injury, the cost of restoration is reason-
able under the circumstances.222 In determining reasonableness, how-
ever, there is no justification for switching the objective benchmark 
from the diminution in market value to the pre-tort market value of 
the property, as is done in Colorado. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The personal reasons exception to the general rule for measuring 
damages by the diminution in market value of injured real property 
is well established. The personal reasons exception allows landowners, 
in appropriate cases, to recover damages measured by the cost of 
restoring the injured property. The personal reasons exception pro-
tects landowners who utilize their property according to their tastes 
and wishes and compensates for loss of value idiosyncratic to the 
landowner. To deny restoration damages in an appropriate case would 
force landowners either to use their property not according to their 
tastes and wishes, sell their property, or absorb significant restoration 
expenses. 
However, different tests for determining when a case is appropriate 
for the personal reasons exception, such as those in California, Colo-
rado, Arizona, and New Hampshire run the risk of producing dissimi-
lar results in similar situations in different states, as well as in cases 
involving similar injuries to different parcels within the same state. 
The Colorado test, as applied in Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., creates 
a significant risk of producing an undue windfall in favor of a land-
owner because it assesses the reasonableness of the restoration cost 
only in comparison to the property's pre-tort market value. The Cali-
fornia test reduces this risk somewhat by mandating a comparison to 
the diminution in market value in addition to the pre-tort market 
value of the property. However, this additional comparison does not 
220 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 56--57 and accompanying text. 
222 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) & cmt.b (1977). 
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eliminate the significance of the pre-tort market value of the property 
in determining the reasonableness of a restoration damages award. A 
three-part test similar to that used in Arizona and New Hampshire 
would balance more appropriately the countervailing tort damages 
goals of full compensation for losses and the avoidance of an undue 
windfall. 
